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Introduction
Cournot theory of duopoly explains a model of 
oligopoly very suitable for economic experiments 
[7]). It occurs when just two firms share a large 
portion of the industry. Because there are only 
two firms, each one when decides about its 
actions has to take into account the other firms’ 
reactions. Since firms may strategically interact in 
different way and be unpredictable, there is not 
a single model of duopoly [3], [5], [6]. This paper 
focuses on the Cournot model of duopoly.
Students in microeconomics are used to appro-
ach the topic of the oligopolistic market structures 
in a strictly theoretical, old fashion, yet effective 
manner. Since this year, at the University Matej 
Bel, it was decided to give to the students the 
possibility to study the oligopoly theory in a lear-
ning-by-doing style. A possible way for doing this 
is to run an in-class experiment after discussing 
with students the textbooks’ parts on oligopoly 
and game theory [4]. At the end of the experiment, 
students reported that they have really learned 
what it is like to strategically interact in an industry 
in which firms have some influence on the market 
variables but not absolute control. They have also 
reported that it is an exciting challenge to elabora-
te strategies in order to gain the highest profits.
The main finding of the experiment is that at the 
beginning of the game students were producing 
more than the quantity that should have been 
theoretically produced in equilibrium. They were 
producing too much thinking to do so was the 
optimal choice. Then, output levels came close to 
the equilibrium quantity as the game advanced. 
Noteworthy, in the last rounds, students were 
able to coordinate on collusive outcome. Then, at 
the end of the game, in the very last round, known 
in advance by students, the temptation to cheat 
on the other group yielded a Pareto inefficient 
outcome. Due to the high level of output and the 
resulting low market price, the total industry profit 
was lower than in the case of both Cournot and 
collusive outcome.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
describes the rules of the in-class experiment. Se-
ction 3 reports on the theoretical equilibrium of 
the one-shot game. Section 4 shows the results 
of the experiment. Section 5 concludes. 
1. Description of the Experiment
In order to run the experiment, students in the 
class are divided into two groups of firms (A and 
B) belonging to the same duopolistic industry. 
The game lasts 10 rounds and students know 
in advance how many rounds the game will last. 
Even though, this is not a good approximation of 
the reality because normally firms do not know 
ex-ante when the market for their products will 
dry up [4], it allows the experimenter to focus on 
the possibility to have weird behavior due to the 
fact that the game is in its last round. For every 
round, each group has to decide its profit maxi-
mizing output level. When decisions are taken, 
the market price is unknown because it depends 
on the total output produced in the industry. The 
game played between the two groups is a simulta-
neous-move quantity-setting á la Cournot, where 
each group when deciding has to make assumpti-
on about the rival’s decision.
One worksheet was distributed (see annex 1) 
to each group of students (firm) in the duopolistic 
industry. The inverse market demand in the form 
of price as a function of total quantity and the cost 
function are known in advance by the students. In 
the cost function there are not fixed costs. The 
production technology is the same for all firms 
and so the marginal cost. Students have infor-
mation about the capacity constraint. But, they 
do not know in advance the market price. The 
common market price, at which it is possible to 
sell all the units produced in any round, is deter-
mined by the total industry production. Therefore, 
it depends not only on the decision of a single 
group, but also on the decision of the other 
group. So, what makes the game interesting is to 
let students interact in each group when deciding 
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its strategy so that they have to make assumptions 
about its rival’s strategy and, since the game is 
repeated, they should learn from past events. For 
every round, each group reports its quantity, the 
other group’s quantity, the common market price 
of the good, its profit and the other group’s profit. 
Note that, students are not explicitly forbidden to 
tacitly collude although exchange of information 
between them is not allowed. 
To stimulate students to maximize profit, each 
student earns extra credit depending on the who-
le group’s average profit yielded over the game. 
Students belonging to the same group receive the 
same number of extra credit points. For this expe-
riment, the duopolistic industry is endowed with 
10 extra credit points to be divided between the 
two firms (groups of students) proportionally to the 
share of the average profit yielded over the game. 
The higher the average profit earned by a group, 
the more extra credit points are earned by each 
member of the group. Consequently, students 
would have an incentive to maximize their group’s 
profit because the more extra credit points they 
earn, the more easily they will pass the exam of 
microeconomics. Note that the final course grade 
is fundamentally based on a written test (100 cre-
dit points), and then the extra credit points (up to 
10) from the in-class experiment are added. 
2. Note on the Nash Equilibrium of 
the One-Shot Cournot Games
The Nash equilibrium of the one-shot Cournot 
game assumes that firms set quantities simulta-
neously and in order to maximize profit each firm 
has to make assumption about the other firm’s 
output choice [2]. Let q
1
 and q
2
 denote the quan-
tities produced by firms 1 and 2. Let P(q
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) =
= a – b(Q) a generic linear inverse market demand 
function or, in other words, the market price pre-
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solve for the Nash equilibrium of this game, we 
have bear in mind that for this model of duopoly, 
the profit maximization problem facing both du-
opolistic firms is symmetric since the production 
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quantity as: 
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Then, the first-order condition for solving it im-
plies that the first (partial) derivative with respect 
to q
1
 in (3) and q
2
 in (4) must be equal to zero:
  
= a - 2bq
1
 - bq
2
 - c 
 
= 0 (5)
 = a - bq
1
 - 2bq
2
 - c 
 
= 0 (6)
which yield the two duopolistic firms’ (symmet-
ric) reaction functions:
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So called since they computes each firm’s best 
reaction to any given output choice by the rival [1] 
solving the system (9)
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the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot duopoly game.
In the in-class experiment, the Nash equilibri-
um of the one-shot Cournot game predicts that 
each player produces 4 units of output. This is 
an equilibrium because each player maximizes its 
own profit given its rival’s output choice and no 
group has an incentive to deviate from its predic-
ted choice [1], [2], [3]. This simultaneous-move 
equilibrium yields a common market price of 9 
and a total industry output of 8 units. The profit 
earned by each group is equal to 32 and the total 
industry profit is 64.
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If the theoretical Nash equilibrium is realized in 
every round of the whole game, each group and 
group’s member as well will earn 5 extra-credit 
points and increase his/her final course grade 
by 5 percent (100 points are available from the 
written test).
If the agreement about the quantity produced is 
realized between the two groups the total output 
will correspond to the collusive profit maximizati-
on output level. To secure maximum of joint profit 
the total output will be fixed at the point where 
the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves in-
tersect each other. In the case of experiment the 
joint-profit maximization output level is 6 units (3 
units produced by each firm). Although collusion 
was not allowed, two groups could tacitly collude 
by watching each other’s performance.
3. Outcome of the Experiment
This experiment, which was run during one of the 
classes of microeconomics, lasted ten rounds. 
In the first round, the industry total quantity 
produced is too much and, being the common 
price determined by the sum of quantities, the 
profits are zero.
In the second round, the group A notably re-
duced the quantity (from 8 to 2 units) while the 
group B kept production to the same level as the 
previous round (6 units). Due to the increased 
common price (9), the group B, which kept con-
stant the output, earned a higher profit cheating 
on the group that reduced the output.
In the third round, the consequence of such 
a free-rider behavior on the part of group B can 
be figured out. The group A, which reduced the 
output in the previous round, now sharply incre-
ases its output as a sign of punishment against 
the rival group (from 2 to 6 units). Due to the very 
high industry total production (12 units) the resul-
ting market price is too low (1) and no profits are 
earned by either group.
In the fourth round, the profit maximizing equi-
librium quantity is produced by each group (4 
units). The common market price is equal to 9 
and each group earns a profit equal to 32.
In the fifth round, while the group A kept con-
stant the output level (4 units), the group B chose 
to reduce its output and produce the joint-profit 
maximization output level (from 4 to 3 units), 
which corresponds to the collusive profit maximi-
zation output level.
In the sixth round, a failed attempt to collude 
can be detected since the group A, which was 
producing its Cournot equilibrium quantity (4 
units) in the previous round, is now choosing to 
maximize the industry joint-profit and produce 
3 units of output. Simultaneously, the group B, 
which already was producing the collusive profit 
maximization output level (3 units) in the previous 
round, is now choosing to produce its Cournot 
equilibrium quantity (4 units).
In the seventh round, both groups implemented 
the same strategy as the previous round keeping 
production to the same level.
In the eight and ninth rounds, is interesting to 
note that the two groups of students were able 
to coordinate on the collusive output level below 
the Cournot duopoly theoretical prediction. Holt 
[3] argues that the reason has to be found in the 
fixed nature of the matching, whereby if matching 
were random the players of the experiment coul-
dn’t coordinate. Even though generally accepted, 
the previous argumentation doesn’t take into 
account the existence of an incentive to cheat 
on the rival through an output expansion. Indeed, 
the collusive profit maximization output level even 
though yields the highest profit as possible for 
both firms is not a Nash equilibrium, since each 
group is tempted to produce more. This can ap-
pear clearer observing the behavior of group B in 
the very last round.
In the tenth and last round, known in advance 
by the students, one group of students (group 
B) cheated on the rival one, increasing the out-
put produced (from 3 to 6). The resulting raise 
in total industry output (9 units) decreased the 
market price and, as a result, the group A that 
kept constant the output level saw its profit 
shrank. At the very end of the game, neither 
Cournot nor collusive outcome was reached but 
the temptation to free ride and cheat on the rival 
group prevailed. 
Concluding Remarks
The following class, students were asked to wri-
te an anonymous report about their experience. 
They emphasized:
It was an original, interesting and helpful way 
for a better understanding of the oligopolistic 
market structure to link the theory with a more 
practical example. It was stimulating and challen-
ging for students to seek to develop strategies 
for attempting to maximize their profit and extra 
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credit points. Playing the game helped students 
to have a more concrete idea of what in reality 
appears to be the maximization-profit problem 
facing a duopolist. The possibility of gaining 
some extra credit points, proportionally to the 
average profit earned by each group over the 
game, has been detected as a good motivation 
for more carefully take into consideration the 
potential rival’s reaction. It also stimulated both 
a competitive atmosphere between groups and 
a cooperative spirit within the same group.
As suggestion for further research, this duopo-
ly game could be extended to show the impact of 
different industry-size on the equilibrium level of 
output and market price (i.e. triopoly). Undoubted-
ly, what we expect is that the three-firm industry’s 
equilibrium will be at a higher output level and 
a lower market price than that of the two-firm 
industry. Another possible extension of this game 
could entail running the experiment before the 
theoretical lecture has taken place so that stu-
dents next should try to discover the theoretical 
foundations by themselves. In educational terms 
such an approach is also known as “discovery 
learning” or “inductive learning”.
Annex 1
In-class experiment worksheet and outcome of 
the experiment
Description of the simultaneous-move 
quantity-setting duopoly game á la Cournot
Your choice is about your own quantity to 
produce each round. Remember, that the market 
price depends on the total industry output. Thus, 
your profit will depend not only on your output, 
but also on your rival’s output. The game will last 
10 rounds. You have information on the inverse 
market demand, the total cost and the marginal 
cost functions. Note that there are not fixed costs. 
Also you have a capacity constraint of 10 units of 
output to be produced. Then, for every round, 
each group has to reports its quantity, the other 
group’s quantity, the common market price of the 
good, its profit and the other group’s profit. 
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ABSTRACT
AN IN-CLASS EXPERIMENT WITH AUGUSTIN COURNOT
DomeNico Raguseo, Maria Horehajova
This paper illustrates the results of an experiment where students were made to play quantity-
-setting game based on the Cournot theory of duopoly. The aim of the in-class experiment was 
to provide student with a more active way of oligopoly strategy learning. At the same time the 
experiment served teachers to earn some experiences from learning-by-doing method of teaching. 
Based on this experiment teachers suppose to introduce similar activities to the study of different 
decision-making models of firms.
Strictly theoretical approach to the study of the oligopolistic market structure was replaced with 
a learning-by-doing method. Although only a short theoretical lecture preceded quantity-setting 
game (essential assumptions of Cournot duopoly model were explained), students were able to 
develop their own strategies from the very beginning of the experiment. Each group of students 
has understood that their decision about quantity produced was not independent but determined 
by the decision of the other group. Hence, they had to make assumptions about its rival’s strategy 
and learn from each additional round of the game. At the end of the experiment students were 
asked to describe anonymously their opinion about new learning method. They found experiment 
interesting, stimulating and challenging. They have reported that they have really understood that 
free rider behavior might harm efficient outcome in market structures where firms can influence 
the main market variables but not absolutely control them. This experiment shows further possible 
extension of duopoly in-class game and it also justifies new approach to the study of different 
market structures. 
Key Words: Experimental Economics, Microeconomics, Game Theory.
JEL Classification: A22, D43.
